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 Chapter 3 
 ‘Inside Out’: The Politics of Enumerating 
the Nation by Ethnicity 
 Tahu  Kukutai and  Victor  Thompson 
3.1  Introduction 
 Since the 1990s, state practices of counting and classifying populations by ethnicity 
have come under increased scrutiny within the social sciences (Arel  2002 ; Kertzer 
and Arel  2002 ; Nobles  2000 ; Perlmann and Waters  2002 ; Petersen  1997 ; Statistics 
Canada and U.S. Census Bureau  1993 ). A number of excellent case studies have 
provided critical insights into how and why ethnic enumeration is pursued in particu-
lar times and places. 1 However, with some notable exceptions (Morning  2008 ; Rallu 
et al.  2006 ), little attention has been given to theorizing or empirically testing a global 
model of ethnic classifi cation and counting. Consequently, there is a limited under-
standing about the general conditions that impede or encourage state recognition of 
ethnicity in the national census and the forms that such recognition takes. 
 This chapter represents an exploratory attempt to develop and test a general 
 theoretical model of ethnic enumeration. It is underpinned by two assumptions. The 
fi rst is that the recognition of ethnic differences in forums such as the census is 
infl uenced by factors that have similar effects across states. This assumption marks 
1  The following is a select list of studies of the ethnic enumeration practices in specifi c countries or 
regions: South Africa (Khalfani and Zuberi  2001 ); Canada (Curtis  2001 ); France (Blum  2002 ); 
Brazil (Bailey and Telles  2006 ); Soviet Union (Arel  2002 ); United Kingdom (Bonnet and 
Carrington  2000 ); and United States (Perlmann and Waters  2002 ; Rodríguez  2000 ). Examples of 
comparative studies across two or more countries include: Nobles ( 2000 ); Rallu et al. ( 2006 ); and 
Marx ( 1998 ). 
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a signifi cant departure from the prevailing view that ethnic enumeration is best 
understood as the unique product of a country’s historical relations and contemporary 
conditions. The second premise is that ethnic classifi cation and counting is 
 infl uenced as much by factors exogenous to states, as by domestic conditions. 
Research in the world society tradition has persuasively shown that states are not 
 disconnected islands, but are enmeshed in global networks through trade, participa-
tion in International Governmental and Nongovernmental Organizations (IGOs and 
INGOS), and the endorsement of global human rights instruments (Cole  2006 ; 
Tsutsui and Wotipka  2004 ). We propose that the extent to which states suppress or 
embrace the recognition of ethnic diversity within their boundaries is likely to be 
infl uenced by their level of integration into global civil society (Meyer et al.  1997 ). 
This theoretical approach is novel, because it considers how integration into world 
society  4 infl uences the recognition of ethnic differences ‘at home’. 
 We examine these proposals through empirical analyses of census and population 
registration forms for 151 countries for the period 1995–2004. Our comparative 
approach enables us to empirically weigh the relative importance of internal 
and external state factors, and it raises a set of fascinating questions. What are the 
domestic conditions or features that systematically encourage or suppress state 
 recognition of ethnic differences? Does state support for ethnic equality on the world 
stage translate into the recognition of ethnic differences at home? Why do some 
states recognise ethnicity as a dimension of difference, but stop short of acknowledging 
specifi c group identities? 
 We begin by considering critical perspectives on census-taking and ethnic 
 enumeration. From the literature we identify a set of factors most likely to predict 
whether states engage ethnic counting and classifi cation and what form it is likely 
to take. After showing the relative distribution of how states enumerate, we use 
maximum likelihood ordered logistic regression models to examine two related 
outcomes: if states enumerate by ethnicity and if specifi c collective identities are 
recognised. Our fi ndings support the prevailing view that national strategies of ethnic 
enumeration are shaped by dynamics internal to states, but we also fi nd support for 
our hypothesis that ties to global civil society matter. The fi ndings confi rm our 
 general argument that the effects of state-level factors, whether internal or external, 
can be generalised across vastly different geographic contexts. This latter fi nding 
offers much promise for broadening the theoretical understanding of ethnic accounting, 
particularly if it can be extended in the future to include a greater set of variables 
and additional time periods. Before discussing the empirical analysis in more detail 
we fi rst briefl y review theories of census-taking and ethnic enumeration below. 
3.2  The Politics of Classifying and Counting by Ethnicity 
 Given the considerable resources involved in producing a census and the varied 
ways in which census data are used, it is unsurprising that governments promote 
census-taking as a universal and effi cient model of objective, scientifi c inquiry 
(Ventresca  1995 ;  2002 ). Among social scientists, however, counting and classifying 
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people is seen fi rst and foremost as a political endeavour ( Anderson  1991 ). As a 
political process, the census is infl uenced by pressures exerted from the ‘top down,’ 
as well as the ‘bottom up’ (Arel  2002 ; Bonnet and Carrington  2000 ; Kertzer and 
Arel  2002 ; Morning and Sabbagh  2005 ; Nobles  2000 ; Prewitt  2000 ; Rallu et al. 
 2006 ). From the former vantage point, ethnic classifi cations and categories are seen 
as an extension of hierarchical arrangements and dominant group interests. Early 
US censuses are an often-cited exemplar of these impositions. Early censuses divided 
the populace into ‘free’ whites, slaves and Indians, taxed or untaxed. Depending on 
which group an individual was assigned to, he or she would be counted as a ‘whole’ 
person, ‘three-fi fths’ of a person, or not at all. 2 This symbolic positioning not only 
justifi ed and reinforced dominant racial logics and race-based inequalities, but also 
infl uenced the balance of power in a way that ensured Southern state interests would 
have a strong presence in US politics (Ellis  2000 ). The federal government’s ability 
to infl uence race is most apparent in its institution of blood quantum rules to deter-
mine who could identify as American Indian, the effect of which was to limit the 
size of the American population and the state’s obligations to them (Snipp  1989 ). 
 The notion that state practices of ethnic enumeration are also shaped from the 
‘bottom up’ is a comparatively recent idea that follows transformations in ethnic 
relations, notably growing diversity and the diffusion of minority rights (Petersen 
 1997 ; Rodríguez  2000 ). Evidence of bottom up politics may be seen in the shifting 
purpose of ethnic data collection, from a tool for maintaining minorities’ sub- ordinance, 
to one that helps ensure compliance with anti-discrimination legislation (Morning 
and Sabbagh  2005 ; Simon  2005 ). In many developed, multicultural countries ethnic 
minorities have successfully lobbied to have ethnic distinctions recognised in 
 offi cial data collections, and sometimes to have their group identities explicitly 
listed on offi cial forms. 3 The US again provides an interesting example with the 
multiracial lobby. In the lead up to the 2000 census, multiracial activists were 
instrumental in pushing through changes that allowed people to tick more than one 
racial category, but failed to institute a specifi c mixed race category (Perlmann and 
Waters  2002 ). 
 Despite a number of groundbreaking studies of ethnic politics and censuses 
within states, few have studied these processes in an international context, and attempts 
to advance theoretical arguments about global enumeration practices are rare. The 
closest to a general theory comes from Rallu et al. ( 2006 ) typology of ethnic 
enumeration. Their model identifi es four dominant paradigms of ethnic counting, 
characterised by different political goals: (1) for political control (e.g., colonial 
censuses); (2) to support a discourse of national hybridity (e.g., Latin America); 
2  The obvious omission of ‘black’ as a category is not accidental. Early censuses were primarily 
interested in a person’s legal and political relationship to the state (Snipp  2003 ). Free blacks were 
subsumed under the category ‘all other free persons,’ thereby distinguishing them from free whites. 
3  In the US, Mexican-American groups successfully lobbied for the inclusion of a separate Hispanic 
Origin category in the 1980 census, while Asian interest groups pushed for the inclusion of specifi c 
categories in the 1980 and 1990 censuses (Nobles  2000 ). By contrast, Arab Americans failed to 
have a pan-ethnic geographic category (Arab American or Middle Easterner) included in the 2000 
census even though they did lobby for its inclusion (Rodríguez  2000 ). 
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(3) for anti-discrimination policies (e.g., US); and, (4) non-enumeration in the name 
of national integration (e.g., France). Implicitly, the typology frames enumeration as 
a top down process, infl uenced by internal conditions such as migration and inter-
ethnic relations. It provides a valuable heuristic framework within which to situate 
states with broadly similar political motivations but, as a typology, is best positioned 
to describe ethnic enumeration rather than explain it. 
 Part of the diffi culty of developing a global theory of ethnic enumeration is the 
lack of a common understanding about the dependent variable – what counts as 
ethnic counting? In the absence of a global standard of identity, states have at their 
disposal a wide range of concepts with which to defi ne difference. In the US human 
difference has historically been fi ltered through the biological frame of phenotype 
or race (Omi and Winant  1994 ). Elsewhere, and at other times, language, origins 
and culture have served as the salient boundaries distinguishing socially defi ned 
groups. Contextual diversity in how difference is understood is complicated by the 
multiple meanings attributed to equivalent terms. Nationality, for example, is 
 interpreted in France as a civic, legal identity akin to citizenship, but in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet states is more closely aligned with cultural identity 
derived from ethnic origins (Kertzer and Arel  2002 ). Even seemingly unambiguous 
markers such as language may be subjectively rendered. Arel’s ( 2002 ) analysis of 
census- taking in the post-Soviet states demonstrates how the distinction between 
mother tongue and everyday language became infused with political meaning, 
bound up with claims to ethnic nationality and territory. Morning ( 2008 ) notes these 
parochial perturbations, but argues that the diversity of ethnic indicators should not 
dissuade from the identifi cation and analysis of cross-national similarities. Her 
innovative comparative research has shown that much of the diverse nomenclature 
used to describe collective identities (e.g., ethnicity, race, ancestry, and indigeneity) 
is underpinned by the common concept of descent. 
 Morning’s work provides a valuable starting point for efforts to develop 
empirically grounded theoretical arguments about ethnic enumeration processes. 
By integrating census and population registration data with information about state 
characteristics and conditions, we are able to empirically test whether countries 
with similar profi les adopt similar strategies for enumerating their populations by 
ethnicity. We also examine whether states go beyond the acknowledgement of 
 ethnic differences, to legitimise collective identities by listing them on the census or 
registration form. Such recognition concedes the presence of pre-existing collective 
identities and may even nominate new ones into existence (Abu-Laban and Stasiulus 
 2000 ). 4 The intent of identifi cation need not be supportive of groups’ rights – indeed, 
such strategies might be pursued to mark out groups for discriminatory treatment, 
or to facilitate ‘statistical fragmentation’ (Arel  2002 ). Our approach is to treat state 
4 An obvious example of nominating groups into existence is the creation of pan-ethnic categories 
such as ‘Asian’, ‘Hispanic’, or ‘Pacifi c Islander’. Although these sorts of aggregations obscure 
important differences between national origin groups and may perpetuate the persistence of group 
stereotypes, those so labelled may also fi nd the grouping to be politically expedient in the pursuit 
of resources and recognition. 
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motivations as unmeasured and focus on establishing whether systematic associations 
exist between state-level factors and strategies of ethnic enumeration. These 
 relationships are elaborated below. 
3.3  Factors Internal to States That Affect Ethnic 
Enumeration 
 In the absence of a general explanatory model of ethnic counting and classifi cation, 
we look to national and regional studies for clues about the factors most likely to 
infl uence state approaches to ethnic enumeration. Though couched in parochial 
terms specific to time or place, there are common themes that can be rendered 
in more abstract and thus generalisable, terms. We identifi ed four sets of factors 
endogenous to states that are critical to understanding how and why states enumerated 
by ethnicity. They are: ethnic group relations, immigration, post-colonial sovereignty 
and resources. 
3.3.1  Ethnic Group Relations 
 Most studies agree that inter-ethnic relations within a country play a key role in 
shaping the ethnic enumeration approach taken in its national census. Depending on 
the specifi c nature of ethnic groups and their concomitant rights claims, relations 
between them could infl uence ethnic classifi cation and enumeration in various 
ways. In seeking to articulate and measure the effects of ethnic relations on ethnic 
counting and classifi cation we focus specifi cally on ethnic contenders. Contender 
groups are those whose collective identities are founded on claims of territorial or 
political independence, or who occupy distinct social and economic niches as a 
result of unequal historical arrangements such as slavery. Ethnic contenders include 
indigenous peoples whose aspirations often include some form of self-government, 
as well as regionally concentrated ethno-nationalist groups with a history of organ-
ised political autonomy (e.g., Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus). From the perspective of 
governments, the claims of such groups are often seen as more contentious than 
those of ethnic immigrants. The latter may seek to retain rights of ethnic customs 
and associations, but they rarely challenge the legitimacy of the political status quo 
in their host countries (Koopmans and Statham  1999 ). The claims of indigenous 
and ethno-nationalist minorities are made especially potent by the growth of 
international support for indigenous rights in legal and political forums, making it 
diffi cult for states to avoid some form of ethnic enumeration. Yet states also have an 
inherent interest in building national cohesion and limiting claims that might arise 
from the politics of recognition. This tension suggests a solution that acknowl-
edges the existence of ethnic difference, but minimises the leverage that such groups 
might gain through the explicit legitimisation of collective identities. 
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3.3.2  Immigration 
 Increasing transnational fl ows of migrant workers and refugees have heightened 
awareness of ethnic differences in states hitherto secure in the myth of ethnic 
 homogeneity and further diversifi ed states with visible multicultural populations. 
Much has been written about how traditional immigrant countries in North America, 
Europe and Australasia have liberalised their exclusionary immigration policies to 
meet pluralistic models of entry and settlement (Dumont and Lemaître  2005 ; 
Pearson  2002 ). Just how immigration shapes ethnic enumeration practices is likely 
to depend on whether immigration is driven by temporary labour market demands, 
or oriented towards more permanent settlement. In the former instance, we expect 
governments will be reluctant to emphasise ethnic differences or legitimate collective 
identities. Rather the impetus is more likely to be geared differentiating the 
native- from the foreign-born through enumeration strategies that focus on civic- 
legal status. Even if the census excludes migrants on short-term permits of one or a 
couple of years, the issue of how to enumerate the rest of the foreign worker population 
remains. 
 Where immigration is linked to more permanent settlement patterns, we expect 
governments will adopt an ethnically cognisant approach. One reason is the 
increased potential for discrimination and ethnic confl ict that arises from signifi cant 
migrant infl ows. Whereas traditional ‘host’ societies tend to contain white  majorities, 
most of the ‘source’ countries comprise persons who constitute visible minorities 
in their new settings. This disjuncture suggests a growing incentive for ethnic 
enumeration because governments require ethnic data to monitor discrimination 
and institute ameliorative policies (Simon  2005 ). Their motives may, of course, be 
less benevolent. The collection of ethnic information may also assist governments 
to monitor and control the dispersion of migrant communities whose ethnic traits 
and patterns of association appear to defy integration into the existing social and 
economic order. 
3.3.3  Post-colonial Sovereignty 
 Historical and political factors feature prominently in research documenting the 
evolution of ethnic enumeration in a specifi c country or region (see, for example, 
Nobles’ research on racial enumeration in the United States and Brazil). A core 
feature of a state’s political trajectory is its history of independence. Whether a state 
has an established history of sovereignty, or emerged from the bonds of colonialism 
or other political struggles, may bear upon the government’s willingness to give 
expression to ethnic differences. States that gained sovereignty after 1965 emerged 
in a fundamentally altered world system – one marked by the Cold War, civil rights, 
ethnic revivalism and the growth of human rights regimes. In 1965 a slew of 
 international organisations emerged, setting an international agenda whose primary 
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goals refl ected the post-colonial and post-war civil rights demands for equality. 
These included the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). The subsequent expansion of international human rights organizations 
under the auspices of the United Nations institutionalised the global recognition of 
minority rights and formalized the expansion of human rights to the masses. States 
born into this new world system may be more inclined to adopt ethnic enumeration 
strategies that refl ect these political sentiments. 
 In addition to coming of age during a period of transformative change, newly 
independent states are less rooted in historical path dependencies and freer to incor-
porate new ideas and discourses trumpeting ethnic equality and the rights of groups 
and individuals to self-defi ne. Processes of ethnic recognition might simply entail 
the continuation of a colonial legacy of drawing ethnic distinctions, but with the 
goal of legitimating ethnic differences, rather than for the purpose of domination 
and exclusion (Rallu et al.  2006 ). By comparison, established states – especially 
ones that have been sovereign for many centuries – are much more likely to be 
vested in an approach that stresses national unity above ethnic differences. The most 
glaring example of this is France’s resistance to the inclusion of ethnic and cultural 
distinctions in its own census in the name of secularism and French identity. 
3.3.4  Resources 
 Finally, a state’s level of resources is also likely to bear upon the kind of ethnic 
enumeration strategy it adopts. The cost of census-taking is well documented. In the 
US alone the 2000 census cost $6.6 billion, double that of the previous census. The 
cost of the 2010 census is expected to be twice as high again, at close to $12 billion 
(United States General Accounting Offi ce  2004 ). Rising costs create a strong 
inducement to rationalise census taking so that only items that yield information 
vital to governance are included. Some countries have dispensed with regular 
 censuses altogether, opting either to construct a virtual censuses from population 
registration data (e.g., the Netherlands), or to administer a nominal household 
census form that is supplemented with other administrative data (e.g., Norway and 
Spain). 5 A more pointed argument is that the politics of diversity, of which ethnic 
enumeration is part and parcel, is a distinctly fi rst world practice that can only be 
afforded by countries with a reasonable standard of living. Although developing 
countries may contain considerable ethnic diversity, resource constraints may mean 
5  The US Census Bureau is now in its fourth year of administering the American Community 
Survey. This new program has replaced the ‘long form’ version of the census that was administered 
to 1 in 6 households until 2000. This change was made to enable a continual collection of data on 
a sub-sample of the U.S. population. The shorter version of the census will continue to be administered 
to the full population. 
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that the census is seen primarily as a tool to document the basics of fertility, mortality, 
literacy and employment, rather than to track the expression of identities. 
3.4  Factors External to States That Affect Ethnic 
Enumeration 
 Historical and structural properties of states might account for the key endogamous 
infl uences on ethnic enumeration practices but alternative theoretical perspectives 
suggest external forces also shape processes of ethnic recognition. Research in 
 comparative politics and sociology, especially the world society literature, emphasise 
the responsiveness of nation-states to global politics and the impacts on domestic 
policy-making (Boli and Thomas  1997 ,  1999 ; Meyer et al.  1997 ). From this per-
spective integration into global civil society ought to lead to isomorphism in ethnic 
enumeration norms and/or practices by drawing countries into a common global 
culture and providing political activists with the forum within which to advocate for 
minority recognition. There are at least two channels through which exogenous fac-
tors might infl uence processes of state recognition. The fi rst is through membership 
in INGOs; the second is through support for specifi c international human rights 
instruments (Cole  2006 ; Tsutsui and Wotipka  2004 ). INGOs and IGOs are distin-
guished in the world society literature by their relationship to the state and civil 
society. While IGOs are often seen as empowering the state and state interests 
(Olzak and Tsutsui  1998 ), INGOs are characterised by their unique position to dif-
fuse global norms about civil society and human rights (Boli and Thomas  1997 , 
 1999 ; Tsutsui  2004 ). States with strong ties to INGOs open up political opportuni-
ties for ethnic groups to  pressure states to adopt policies that compliment interna-
tional agreements about human rights (McAdam and Rucht  1993 ). 
 Since the 1960s, the United Nations has established a slew of international 
 treaties enshrining the rights of minorities with the express goal of forcing governments 
to act even-handedly towards them. As one of the UN’s oldest human rights instruments 
ICERD expressly prohibits ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin’, and it allows for the 
provision of special measures to ensure the ‘adequate development and protection 
of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them’. In theory, states that 
 signal their commitment to ethnic equality on the world stage ought to pursue ethnic 
enumeration because it legitimates the expression of diversity within their borders 
and provides the bases for the collection of data with which to evaluate and amelio-
rate group-level disparities (Morning and Sabbagah  2005 ). In reality, several factors 
militate against this. One is that ratifi cation of a convention need not engender a 
genuine commitment to its goals (Cole  2006 ; Neumayer  2005 ). The stringency with 
which conventions are monitored and enforced can vary widely, making it relatively 
easy for nominally committed members to evade their responsibilities. In some cases, 
provisions for monitoring, compliance and enforcement are ostensibly  nonexistent 
or weak, with powerful states often loath to use coercive strategies to pressure states 
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into addressing their poor human rights records (Neumayer  2005 ). To some extent, 
we see the disconnection between membership and commitment as a problem of 
measurement. Rather than treat ratifi cation as an expression of a state’s commitment, 
we prefer to measure commitment directly. This allows for a more careful evaluation 
of how expressed dedication to ethnic equality in the international arena translates 
into ethnic enumeration practices at home. 
 A trickier problem to resolve is the fact that although most signatories to ICERD 
condemn ethnic discrimination, there is no consensus about whether ethnic data 
collection is the salve. Some states view the collection of ethnic data as necessary to 
combat discrimination; others, as an act of discrimination in itself (Arel  2002 ). 
Indeed several European countries have argued that their commitment to eliminating 
discrimination is precisely why they do  not enumerate by ethnicity. However, 
 arguments invoking the historical misuse of ethnic data (e.g., to identify Jewish 
individuals during WWII) and constitutional prohibitions have been found wanting. 
Investigations have found several of the countries claiming non-enumeration on 
those grounds nevertheless collect ethnic data ‘under the radar’, especially on 
visible minorities of interest (e.g., Roma in the Czech Republic, and Romanians and 
Algerians in France, see Goldston  2004 ). Moreover, upon closer examination, it has 
been found most constitutions do not explicitly prohibit ethnic data collection but 
rather impose restrictions that make its collection subject to specifi c privacy and 
protection safeguards (Ramsay  2006 ). Our view is that concerns about enumeration 
as a form of discrimination testify to the ongoing salience of ethno-racial distinctions 
within states’ boundaries. Without ethnic data, strategies to eliminate discrimination 
by ethnicity are impossible – a genuine commitment to eliminating ethnic discrimination 
requires ethnic data. 
3.5  Data and Method 
 To examine the connections between the foregoing factors and state processes of 
ethnic recognition and legitimisation, we use data from the Ethnicity Counts? 
 database, which codes national census questionnaires and population registration 
forms for the period 1985 to 2014. 6 For the purpose of this study we restrict our 
analysis to the 2000 census round which spans the decade 1995 to 2004. To defi ne 
the sample population we consulted the United Nations Statistics Division’s 
(UNSD) list of countries that existed in June 2005, then referred to a separate UNSD 
list to determine whether a census was conducted in the 2000 census round (also see 
Morning, Chap.  2 , this volume). 7 We restricted our analysis to sovereign states for 
6  Ethnicity Counts? was funded by a Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden grant. The census 
forms are available at:  http://www.waikato.ac.nz/nidea/research/ethnicitycounts . 
7  The UNSD’s list of nations and territories can be found at:  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/
m49/m49alpha.htm . A separate list containing information on national censuses conducted for 
each decennial period may be found at:  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/
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which a 2000 round form could be located. The exclusion of territories and depen-
dencies was necessary to avoid infl ating the effects of governing states (e.g., United 
States), and because membership in ICERD is limited to sovereign nations. 8 Of the 
203 nations in our sample, 175 had conducted a census in the latest round, for which 
151 forms were located. 9 To maximise our sample, we included countries missing 
from the 2000 round for which forms for preceding or successive rounds could be 
located. The earliest census form was for 1995; the most recent was for 2004. 
Because our interest is in the factors underlying state processes of ethnic recogni-
tion, we also deviated from a strict focus on the census to include countries that 
maintained population registers as a substitute. 10 Population registers are prevalent 
throughout Europe, providing a regularly updated source of information on 
 individuals (Poulain and Herm  2013 ). The scope of data collection varies across 
countries, but may include information on births, deaths, marriage and dissolution, 
family relations, education, employment, taxation, residence and migration status 
(Legoux and Perrin  1999 ). For each population registration country, we obtained 
copies of the appropriate forms directly from the agencies responsible for adminis-
tering the databases. Once the census questionnaires and population registration 
forms were assembled and translated, we coded a wide array of ethnic variables. 
censusdates.htm . We expand the range of years to 1995–2004. This adds 3 states (The Holy See, 
Bhutan, and the United Arab Emirates) that would otherwise be excluded from the data and has no 
effect on the overall results. 
8  Our argument that a state’s ethnic enumeration strategy is the result of endogenous and exogenous 
factors implies temporality and causality. We note an inevitable lag exists between fi nalising the 
census questionnaire and the enumeration date. In countries that perform a decennial census, 
 decisions about what items and categories to include may be decided up to 3 years in advance. To 
allow for this lag we constructed most of the predictor variables to measure conditions at the start 
of the census round (i.e., 1995 or earlier). Because the vast majority of censuses in our sample were 
conducted between 2000 and 2004, we minimise the risk that the predictor variables followed 
rather than preceded the census. Nevertheless, the cross-sectional nature of our data means we 
cannot determine causality, even if the models used suggest a causal relationship. Only longitudinal 
analysis of questionnaires would satisfy the more rigorous conditions needed to test whether 
changes in exogenous and endogenous factors produced changes in processes of ethnic recognition 
or group legitimation. We are fairly confi dent, however, that changes in the outcome variables are 
likely to be unidirectional. All the evidence suggests that states that enumerate by ethnicity are 
unlikely to revert to a non-cognisant approach. 
9  We used a combination of strategies to locate census forms. We were able to download many of 
the questionnaires from the University of Minnesota’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS) International website ( http://www.hist.umn.edu/~rmccaa/IPUMSI/enumform.htm ) and 
from the website of the United Nations Statistics Division ( www.unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/
sources/census/censusquest.htm ) The remaining forms were located on the websites of national 
census offi ces, and through direct correspondence with those offi ces. 
10  Our sample included 14 population registration countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Faeroe 
Islands, Greenland, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, San Marino, Andorra, Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the cases of Norway, Finland, Spain and Belgium, nominal 
censuses (i.e., using dwellings forms) were conducted in the 2000 round, but the primary source of 
data on the population was derived from population registers, thus we only coded the latter. In 
cases where countries conducted a full census (i.e., using a personal form) and maintained a 
 population register we only coded the census form (e.g., Estonia). 
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Relaxing the selection criteria to include forms beyond the 2000 census round and 
population registration countries yielded a fi nal sample size of 151 states. The 
characteristics of our sample can be seen in Table  3.1 .
3.5.1  Variables 
 Our fi rst dependent variable,  ethnic cognisance , measures the number of ethnicity 
items listed on a state’s census questionnaire or, in the case of population registra-
tion countries, the total number of unique ethnicity questions asked across all of the 
constituent instruments. We operationalise ethnicity to include questions that use 
the following terms: ethnicity, ethnic group, ethnic origin, descent, ancestry, race, 
indigenous, tribe, language, mother tongue, nationality, national origins and ethnic 
nationality. The variable is coded on an ordered scale from 0 to 3 where 0 = no 
 questions; 1 = one question; 2 = 2 questions; and 3 = 3 or 4 questions. 11 Since the 
variable only had a range of 0–3 we treat it as an ordered categorical variable in our 
models. Our second dependent variable,  ethnic legitimisation is a dummy variable 
that indicates whether states explicitly nominate groups into existence by specifying 
the name of at least one ethnic group on the enumeration form. States were coded 
as 1 if at least one ethnic group name was listed or appeared as a tick box on the 
form, and 0 otherwise. 12 
 The endogenous variables cover structural properties of states, as well as inter- group 
dynamics arising from the presence or absence of migrants and ethnic minorities. 
With respect to immigration we use two separate measures. The fi rst,  net migration 
rate , was derived from the United Nations’ World Population Prospects data (United 
Nations  2000 ). It is the net average annual number of migrants from 1995–2000 per 
11  In making these determinations, we encountered several ambiguities regarding the use of ethnic 
terminology and number of items elicited. Some census forms did not contain a specifi c reference 
to ethnicity (or race etc.) in the question or heading, although the response categories clearly indi-
cated an ethnic distinction. For example, the Honduras census asked: ‘ A que grupo poblacional 
pertenece? ’ [‘To what population group do you belong?’], with response categories that included 
indigenous populations such as the Lenca and the Pech (Paya). Similarly, the Canadian census 
simply asked ‘Is this person’, followed by a list of tick boxes that include White, Chinese and Latin 
American. In these sorts of cases the item was coded as an ethnicity item. In other instances, 
 several questions were asked about a single dimension of difference. Again using the Canadian 
example, three separate questions were asked for aboriginal identity, membership in an Indian 
Band/First Nation; and status as a Treaty or Registered Indian. These too were treated as a single 
case of aboriginal recognition. 
12  We ran two alternative confi gurations of ethnic legitimisation. The fi rst included write-in prompts 
with examples, of which there were 12 cases. Our rationale was that a write-in prompt with an 
example constituted a weak form of identity legitimisation when compared to the explicit naming 
of a tick-box or response category. Nevertheless, when we ran the same models including the 
write-in with examples, the results were similar in signifi cance and direction. The second alternative 
model omitted identities based on mother tongue from the ethnic legitimisation category, with the 
rationale that language categories do not necessarily constitute collective identities (n = 13) . This 
yielded signifi cant, albeit weaker effects, in the same direction. 
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1,000 people. We selected net migration over the number of foreign- born persons 
because it captures the most recent newcomers to the population, rather than the 
cumulative effect of immigration. 
 Unfortunately, the scarcity of complete and internationally comparable data on 
immigrant workers means we are unable to include a direct measure. Instead, to 
capture the visibility of immigrant workers in the labour market we use the percentage 
of international migrants that is male as a proxy. 13 This variable is taken from the 
United Nations’ Population, Resources, Environment and Development data bank 
(PRED Bank  2006 ). The international spread of migrant workers has historically 
been characterised as a male dominated phenomena (Houstoun et al.  1984 ), albeit 
that women have a growing presence among global migrant communities (Pedraza 
 1991 ; Alcala  2006 ). At the very least, our proxy variable is indicative of a sex 
 imbalance that may translate into differential treatment of immigrants within the 
borders of host states. 
 We constructed the variable  ethnic contender using Phase IV data from the Minority 
at Risk (MAR) project, maintained by the Center for International Development and 
Confl ict Management at the University of Maryland. The global dataset identifi es 
284 communal groups that were politically active in 2003, classifi ed into 6 types of 
minorities: ethnoclass; ethnonationalist; indigenous; religious; communal contenders; 
and national minorities. 14 We constructed a dummy variable coded 1 if an indigenous, 
ethnonationalist, or ethnoclass group existed within a state; and 0 otherwise. We 
note that MAR data is compiled from multiple sources besides the census, which 
minimises the risk that the variable  ethnic contender is endogenous to the measured 
outcomes. For example, MAR identifi es fi ve separate ‘minorities at risk’ in France, 
including Muslims, Basques and Corsicans. The absence of offi cial ethnic or racial 
data in France as the criteria used to defi ne these groups in the MAR dataset was not 
based on census or population registration forms alone. 
 To capture a state’s level of national resources we use the 3 year average (1990, 
1995 and 2000) of Gross Domestic Product per capita in (GDP), measured in 
 constant US$. A natural log-transformation was performed to correct for a skewed 
distribution. The historical emergence of state autonomy is measured with a dummy 
13  We were unable to include a direct measure of immigrant workers because, for the 2000 census 
round, such data was only available for 20 % of countries in the International Labour Organization’s 
International Labour Migration Database (see:  http://laborsta.ilo.org/ ). Nevertheless, to test the 
robustness of our proxy variable, we ran our models using the direct measure of immigrant workers 
in 1995 as a predictor variable. These models were restricted to 43 states. We then used multiple 
imputation techniques to reconstruct the 1995 ILO immigrant worker variable and re-ran the 
models. In both cases, the predictive power of immigrant workers was signifi cant and similar in 
magnitude and strength as our proxy variable for immigrant males. 
14  The MAR dataset focuses specifi cally on ethno-political, non-state communal groups that have 
contemporary political signifi cance because they collectively suffer, or benefi t from, systematic 
discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and, are the basis for political 
mobilization and collective action in pursuit of self-defi ned group interests. The majority of groups 
documented in Phase IV of the project were also politically active in Phase I, covering 1945–1990. 
For a description of the project see Gurr ( 1993 ). The Minorities at Risk data were obtained from: 
 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ . 
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variable  new sovereign nation . We coded countries as 1 if they gained sovereignty 
after 1965; and 0 otherwise. 15 
 We constructed three variables to capture the effects of exogenous factors on 
state enumeration practices. Two of them measure a state’s commitment to interna-
tional treaties associated with the elimination of ethnic and racial discrimination. 
The fi rst is a dummy variable  ICERD signatory coded 1 if the state is a signatory to 
ICERD; 0 otherwise. The second is a measure of state commitment to ICERD based 
on the following factors: (1) if ICERD was signed; (2) if Article 14 was enforced, 
vesting the ICERD committee with the power to hear individual and group grievances 
against member states; (3) if at least 50 % of reports due were fi led within the 
 allotted timeframe; and (4) if countries signed ICERD on or before 1975. We treat 
commitment as a 4-point interval variable with 0 representing no membership in 
ICERD and 4 being fully committed. Ties to the international community are measured 
through a state’s involvement with international nongovernmental organisations. 
The  INGO variable represents the total number of organisations of which a state is 
a member, either directly or through the presence of member organisations within 
that country. We take the natural log of INGO to correct for skewness. 
 Finally, we include several control variables. The  Gini index controls for the effect 
of relative income inequalities on state processes of ethnic recognition. We derived 
Gini values from the 2007 World Bank development indicators (World Bank  2007 ) 
for a range of years over the 2000 census time frame (1994–2005). Where recent data 
was unavailable we used older data extending back to 1989 (n = 8), or imputed values 
using multiple imputation techniques (n = 20, see Shaefer  2002 ). Index values vary 
from 0 to 100, with 0 representing perfect equality. We also control for regional 
variation by using a region variable that denotes the broad geographic area in which 
a state is located. The literature suggests regional variation in ethnic recognition is 
partially due to historical trajectories such as slavery, colonisation, civil wars and so 
forth. We do not try to model these processes directly but treat the region variable as 
a weak proxy for these historical variations in state governing practices. Lastly, for 
reasons that may include differential resources, lack of infrastructure or newness of 
states, there are varying lengths of questionnaires in terms of the number of questions 
asked. We created a dummy variable that was coded as 0 if states had less than the 
median number of questions on their census form (median = 20) and 1 if states had a 
greater than median length of questions (see Table  3.2 ). 
3.6  Results 
 We start by briefl y discussing the results of our descriptive analysis by broad geographic 
region (see Table  3.3 ). Like Morning ( 2008 ), we found signifi cant regional variation in 
the prevalence of ethnic enumeration and in the concepts used to defi ne difference. 
15  Information on the sovereignty status of each country in our sample was derived from the  website 
of the US State Department:  http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/10543.htm . 
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 Table 3.2  Distribution of Key Variables by Region, 1995–2004 (N = 151) 
 Key variables in 
model  Africa  Europe 
 South 
America  Asia 
 North 
America  Oceania  Total 
 Dependent variables 
 Cultural cognizance – Dependent variable 
 Recognizes 0 items  9  18  2  11  3  1  44 
 Recognizes 1 item  14  15  4  17  6  7  63 
 Recognizes 2 items  4  11  3  6  8  3  35 
 Recognizes 3 or 4 
items 
 1  0  1  0  4  3  9 
 Total recognizing at 
least 1 item 
 67.9 %  59.1 %  80.0 %  67.6 %  85.7 %  92.9 %  70.9 % 
 Ethnic legitimization 
(%) – Dependent 
variable 
 Yes  21.4 %  36.4 %  60.0 %  41.2 %  85.7 %  57.1 %  43.3 % 
 Independent variables: external to states 
 Ties to CERD 
 Signatory countries 
in region (%) 
 40.0 %  54.5 %  80.0 %  26.5 %  52.4 %  14.3 %  43.1 % 
 Ethnic commitment 
(total) 
 Not a member  2  1  0  2  2  0  7 
 Committed 1 
dimension 
 13  9  1  21  7  12  63 
 Committed 2 
dimensions 
 9  16  5  8  9  1  48 
 Committed 3 or 4 
dimensions 
 4  18  4  3  3  1  33 
 Ties to INGOs 
 Average per region  1,239  3,464  2,237  1,502  1,625  953  2,040 
 Independent variables: Internal to states 
 Ethnic contender 
present (%) 
 39.3 %  45.5 %  70.0 %  47.1 %  42.9 %  21.4 %  43.7 % 
 New state  33.3 %  31.8 %  20.0 %  37.1 %  38.1 %  78.6 %  37.7 % 
 1Net migration  −842.1  18,756.3  −820.0  −41,443.8  56,876.4  13,112.7  5,048.9 
 Percent of 
international migrants 
that are male, 2000 
 52.4 %  47.3 %  50.1 %  56.3 %  49.9 %  54.4 %  51.5 % 
 Ethnic 
fractionalization 
 62.0 %  32.0 %  50.0 %  41.0 %  36.0 %  33.0 %  41.0 % 
 Controls 
 GDP, 1995 (constant 
1990 US$) 
 $870  $13,008  $2,490  $3,767  $4,737  $3,958  $6,012 
 GINI  47.9  32.1  54.7  37.3  47.7  59.3  42.4 
 Percent of region that 
is sovereign 
 100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 %  94.6 %  80.1 %  82.4 %  93.9 % 
 Source : Ethnicity Counts? database ( http://www.waikato.ac.nz/nidea/research/ethnicitycounts ) 
 1Numbers in tables refl ect the values of net migration after performing a Box-Cox transformation 
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In Oceania, for example, ethnic enumeration was near universal but in Africa, 
Europe and Asia, ethnic enumeration ranged from 59.1 % in Europe to roughly 
68 % in African and Asia. Overall, ethnic terminology was most often used to defi ne 
difference, although regional preferences were also apparent. 16 In South America, 
concepts of indigeneity and tribe prevailed while references to ethnic nationality 
and race were largely confi ned to Europe and North America respectively. In about 
16  If a question contained references to two concepts – for example, ‘ethnicity or nationality’ – it 
was coded in terms of both. References to color were coded as ‘race’. Where questions referred to 
a community or population, they were coded according to the response categories. If there was 
clearly a reference to ‘race’ or ‘color’, it was coded as race. If it appeared to be a nationality or 
ethnicity, it was coded accordingly. 
 Table 3.3  Maximum likelihood ordered logistic regression models for ethnic cognizance 
 Control variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Population, 1995 (in ten millions)  0.02  0.02  0.01 
 Long questionnaire 1  0.76  *  1.21  **  1.38  ** 
 Region 2 
    Africa  −0.50  −0.68  −0.72 
    Asia  0.05  0.36  1.12 
    South America  1.10  1.47  0.87 
    North America  1.65  **  2.00  **  2.66  ** 
    Oceania  0.81  1.50  2.21  * 
 Endogenous variables 
 Immigration 
 Net migration, 1995–2000 (in ten thousands)  0.02  0.03  * 
 Percent of international migrants (male), 2000  −0.10  **  −0.12  ** 
 Ethnic contender  0.97  **  0.91  * 
 Sovereign after 1965  1.22  **  2.35  ** 
 GDP, 1995–2000 (log)  −0.43  *  −0.82  ** 
 Gini 3  −0.03  −0.02 
 Exogenous variables 
 CERD 
    CERD signatory  0.23 
    Ethnic commitment  0.77  * 
 # of INGOs, 2000 (log)  0.61  * 
 N  151  151  151 
 Likelihood ratio chi-square  31.7  **  71.89  **  91.47  ** 
 * ≤ .05; ** ≤ .01 (two-tailed tests) 
 Source : Ethnicity Counts? database ( http://www.waikato.ac.nz/nidea/research/ethnicitycounts )
 1 Compared to questionnaires with less than median number of questions. We did not count the 
number of questions on population registers 
 2 Compared to Europe 
 3 Gini coeffi cients are derived from a range of years. There are 133 countries with Gini coeffi cients 
between the years 1989–2002, and 16 from earlier years. Two were imputed 
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half of all countries (56.7 %) the recognition of ethnic differences did not extend to 
the recognition of specifi c group identities. Only a little more than a third of 
European and Asian countries explicitly recognized group identities on their forms 
and only one-fi fth in Africa, signifi cantly less than the proportion that counted by 
ethnicity. North America and Oceania were the only regions for which the listing of 
ethnic groups on the census was commonplace. 
 In terms of the independent variables, a clear distinction is evident between 
immigrant receiving (Europe, North America, and Oceania) and sending regions 
(Asia, South America, and Africa). The growing presence of female immigrants in 
developed regions of the world is also apparent, with North America and Europe 
having slightly less male than female immigrants. The ethnic contender variable 
highlights two outliers. Oceania and South America represent two ends of the con-
tinuum with 70 % of South American countries having at least 1 ethnic contender 
group, compared to just one-fi fth of Oceanic countries. Regional variation was also 
apparent with respect to the exogenous variables. Europe, Africa and South America 
had the highest percentage of state signatories to ICERD, whereas Asia and Oceania 
had relatively few signatories. Regions with the highest proportion of signatories 
also tended to be the most committed. Finally, we see regional variation with respect 
to participation in INGOs. The large number of INGOs in Europe and the sparse 
involvement of Oceania and Asia most likely refl ect regional variation in the level 
of involvement in global civil society generally and national resource capacities. 
 Tables  3.3 and  3.4 examine the intersection between the foregoing elements using 
ordered logistic and binominal logistic models. We begin by exploring the factors 
associated with a state’s level of ethnic cognizance. In light of the strong regional 
differences apparent in the earlier tables, we expected geographic location to exert an 
effect on a state’s propensity to recognize ethnic distinctions. This was the case for 
North and South America and, to a lesser degree, Oceania. Compared to European 
states, those in North America were about 9 times more likely to  enumerate by eth-
nicity, while states in South America and Oceania were three to four times more 
likely to do so. The coeffi cient for questionnaire length was positive and signifi cant, 
with instruments of above median length more likely to elicit ethnic information. 
This cannot be attributed to national differences in resource capacities, as the effect 
remained even when GDP was included. Rather, it suggests governments that are 
committed to fully documenting their population’s characteristics are more disposed 
to recognize ethnicity as a necessary component of the national stock-take.
 Results from model 2 in Table  3.3 are consistent with the prevailing view that 
endogenous factors are important infl uences of whether states support ethnic 
 enumeration. States with higher levels of net immigration were slightly more likely 
to recognize ethnic distinctions, whereas the presence of immigrant workers, 
measured by our proxy variable, male immigrants, had a countervailing effect. 
Consistent with our expectation, the presence of an ethnic contender enhanced the 
likelihood of ethnic recognition; although the variable’s magnitude and signifi cance 
was slightly reduced once exogenous variables were introduced (model 3). Nevertheless, 
states with at least one indigenous, ethnonationalist, or ethnoclass minority were 
twice as likely to recognize ethnic distinctions as those without. Taken together, the 
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group variables suggest the benefi ts of specifying the ethnic terrain within which 
decisions about ethnic recognition are undertaken. Immigrants, foreign workers and 
ethnic contenders all appear to infl uence, in different ways, the willingness of states 
to enumerate ethnicity, irrespective of their structural properties. 
 With respect to the latter, we were surprised to fi nd that state resource capacities, 
measured by GDP, were negatively associated with ethnic cognizance. We can only 
speculate that countries with high GDP are less likely to have internal pressures on 
the state due to the relative wealth of its citizens. That is, favourable material conditions 
may have a unifying effect on the country, reducing the likelihood of ethnic disen-
franchisement, or making it diffi cult for ethnic advocates to gain traction. In turn, 
such conditions may be less likely to draw the attention of international organizations 
 Table 3.4  Maximum likelihood logistic regression models for ethnic legitimization 
 Control Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Population, 1995 (in ten millions)  0.01  0.01  −0.02 
 Long questionnaire 1  0.35  0.56  0.55 
 Region 2 
    Africa  −0.77  −1.00  −1.50 
    Asia  0.02  0.73  1.17 
    South America  0.75  0.63  0.01 
    North America  2.29  **  2.44  **  2.62  ** 
    Oceania  0.76  1.07  1.32 
 Endogenous Variables 
 Immigration 
 Net migration, 1995–2000 (in ten thousands)  0.01  0.00 
 Percent of international migrants (male), 2000  −0.13  **  −0.14  ** 
 Ethnic contender  0.11  −0.28 
 Sovereign after 1965  0.36  1.32  ** 
 GDP, 1995–2000 (log)  −0.29  −0.71  ** 
 Gini 3  0.01  0.03 
 Exogenous Variables 
 CERD 
    CERD signatory  0.50 
    Ethnic commitment  0.08 
 # of INGOs, 2000 (log)  1.01  ** 
 Constant  −0.78  *  6.61  *  2.43 
 N  151  151  151 
 Likelihood ratio chi-square  27.31  **  46.03  **  56.36  ** 
 * ≤ .05; ** ≤ .01 (two-tailed tests) 
 Source : Ethnicity Counts? database ( http://www.waikato.ac.nz/nidea/research/ethnicitycounts ) 
 1 Compared to questionnaires with less than median number of questions. We did not count the 
number of questions on population registers 
 2 Compared to Europe 
 3 Gini coeffi cients are derived from a range of years. There are 133 countries with Gini coeffi cients 
between the years 1989–2002, and 16 from earlier years. The rest were imputed 
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that might otherwise push for minority differences to be addressed. States that 
gained independence in the post-1965 period of ethnic and post-colonial transformations 
were also more likely than the established states to recognize ethnic distinctions. 
 Turning to the exogenous variables, we fi nd signifi cant support for our hypothe-
ses that international ties infl uence state processes of ethnic recognition. Consistent 
with fi ndings from world society research (e.g., Neumayer  2005 ), we fi nd simply 
being a signatory of ICERD has little effect on whether or not a state enumerates by 
ethnicity. Of greater importance is the level of commitment that states exhibit in 
their participation in these organizations. For each level of state commitment to 
ICERD, the likelihood of enumerating by ethnicity doubled. These fi ndings 
 challenge the implicit assumption that ethnic enumeration is exclusively or even 
primarily the product of endogenous state characteristics. It also suggests state 
expressions of support for eliminating ethnic and racial inequities and ensuring 
minority rights are not just displays of empty benevolence, but can translate into the 
active recognition of those differences. Our argument that global civil society 
matters is buttressed by the positive effect of participation in INGOs, with an increased 
likelihood of ethnic recognition among those states with more INGO linkages. 
 The models in Table  3.4 provide insights into the factors that underlie state 
 recognition of ethnic differences generally, but do they extend to the recognition of 
specifi c group identities? To answer this question we re-ran the same models, 
changing the outcome variable to refl ect the recognition of specifi c group identities 
(see Table  3.4 ). Interestingly, immigration fl ows, ethnic contender groups and com-
mitment to ICERD – all variables signifi cantly associated with ethnic cognizance – 
were inconsequential to state recognition of specifi c groups. In keeping with the 
earlier results, the presence of foreign workers decreased the likelihood of group 
recognition, as did a higher level of state resources. Regional effects were also 
stronger than in earlier models. North American states were about 17 times more 
likely than European states to name a group on their enumeration forms, perhaps 
refl ecting the prevalence of identity politics in the former part of the world. 17 States 
that gained independence after 1965 were also much more disposed to recognize 
specifi c group identities. Included among these states were the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia whose ‘Velvet Revolution’ began a series of events that led to the mostly 
peaceful dissolution of the former Czechoslovakia; Fiji and East Timor, which 
broke from the colonial legacies of oppression and control; and states such as 
Namibia and Lesotho whose independence was secured only after civil war and/or 
internal disputes. To some extent the effect of recent independence is also likely to 
capture international infl uences, given that many of these states were born into a 
fundamentally altered world system.
 Overall, our models suggest a commonality between the factors that infl uence 
processes of ethnic recognition and identity legitimization. That is, these processes 
may be theoretically distinguished, but are diffi cult to separate out empirically. We 
note, however, that the models in Table  3.4 provide a somewhat weak test of identity 
17  These effects were weaker when we excluded countries using population registries from the 
analysis. North American states were only about six times more likely in these models. 
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legitimization processes. A more nuanced distinction between the specifi c groups 
listed on census questionnaires and registration forms might have yielded somewhat 
different results but our goal was to tap general processes, rather than to home in on 
particular sorts of ethnic minorities. 
3.7  Discussion 
 This study was motivated by two broad concerns. The fi rst was the dearth of a 
comprehensive, empirically driven research agenda on the factors underlying state 
recognition of ethnic differences and group identities in enumeration practices. 
Notwithstanding the important contributions made by the numerous case studies of 
ethnic classifi cation regimes, we were concerned by the implicit message that state 
practices were best understood as parochial products of unique historical, political 
and social factors. To some extent, our fi ndings support the prevailing view that 
structural conditions, internal group relations and state histories are important 
infl uences on processes of ethnic recognition. However, we go further to show that 
these infl uences can be generalized beyond specifi c national contexts. Consistent 
with Morning’s fi nding of an underlying cohesion to apparently divergent indicators 
of ethnicity; our cross-national comparative approach has revealed systematic 
 patterns in the factors that infl uence state processes of recognition. Often these 
factors have similar effects across states that, at fi rst blush, would appear to have 
very little in common. 
 Our second concern was the almost exclusive focus on endogenous state factors 
and the contradiction this posed with broader sociological efforts to nest state-level 
processes within a global context. By including exogenous infl uences alongside 
endogenous ones, we were able to demonstrate that ties to global civil society do 
have some bearing on national ethnic enumeration practices. First, we showed that 
the expression of state commitment to human rights instruments on the world stage 
was strongly associated with a greater willingness to recognize ethnic differences 
within national borders, even if this did not extend to the recognition of specifi c 
group identities. Second, state participation in INGOs enhanced the likelihood of 
both ethnic recognition and state legitimization. 
 Our fi ndings may be best understood by conceptualizing the effects in terms of 
internal and external pressures. Internally, there are two types of pressures on the 
state: those that emanate from groups and those associated with structural condi-
tions. With respect to groups, we singled out those that were most dominant in the 
literature – that is, established ethnic minorities with particular rights claims that 
challenge the state. In our models, higher levels of net immigration and the presence 
of an ethnic contender group were positively associated with the likelihood of 
ethnic enumeration. These fi ndings are consistent with our expectation that these 
groups are suffi ciently entrenched in state politics and able to mobilize at least some 
support for recognition, even if it does not always translate into a formal legitimization 
of the group on questionnaires and population registries. In addition, the presence of 
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immigrants heightens awareness of difference within the state and the likelihood of 
recognition of ethnic groups as members of its citizenry. The increased visibility of 
immigrant workers had a countervailing effect, decreasing the odds of ethnic cogni-
zance. This latter fi nding suggests states may be more likely to minimize differences 
in the context of the perceived economic and social threat posed by a large popula-
tion of immigrant workers. We note too that migration variables are not strictly 
endogenous as they clearly tap into international migration fl ows. However, to the 
extent that inward migration shapes the ethnic terrain of the receiving society, we 
are able to conceptualize them as primarily endogenous. 
 Pressures from the ‘inside’ also arise from structural conditions. Our fi nding that 
older independent states are less likely to enumerate by ethnicity points to historical 
path dependencies and a distancing from the post-colonial push for minority and 
indigenous rights. Finally, states with a high GDP may have less at stake in terms of 
violating global human rights norms and be less likely to receive opposition from 
ethnic groups within their states, given their economic position and relative lack of 
deprivation. 
 To our knowledge this research represents the fi rst empirical attempt to model 
the processes underlying state enumeration practices in a systematic fashion. By 
providing theoretical motivations for our variables and identifying key mechanisms, 
we have made a start to more general theorizing about ethnic enumeration. In the 
process, we have contributed to knowledge about the ways racial and ethnic 
categories work around the globe. As our title suggests, ethnic enumeration appears 
to be best understood as the product of factors that are internal  and external to states, 
rather than one or the other. Our fi ndings are of growing importance as states are 
confronted with increased rates of immigration, and the recognitive demands of 
national minority groups show no signs of abating. Despite the limitations  associated 
with cross-sectional research, we are careful to distinguish between causality and 
relationship. For the time being, it is diffi cult to make a causal argument, but given 
the availability of previous censuses, there is a great deal to learn from exploring 
repeated cross-sections of census rounds. 
 Theorizing these processes is at an early stage in its development, but we have 
been greatly assisted by developments in data collection. Until recently, the collection 
of census forms was a long and tedious project. Each country had to be contacted 
separately, which took a great deal of time as attested to by our efforts to collect 
questionnaires in this manner. The concerted efforts of a few individuals and 
 organizations and the widespread availability of electronic versions of question-
naires from online sources means the collection of enumeration forms is now much 
more effi cient. These collective efforts have made this and future research projects 
possible. Consequentially, the future of theorizing and empirically mapping global 
strategies of ethnic enumeration appears to be blossoming. 
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